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Abstract
Concerning the solution theory for cooperative games with transferable utility, it is well-
known that the Shapley value is the most appealing representative of the family of (not
necessarily ecient) game-theoretic solutions with an additive potential representation.
This paper introduces a new solution concept, called Multiplicativily Proportional (MP )
value, that can be regarded as the counterpart of the Shapley value if the additive po-
tential approach to the solution theory is replaced by a multiplicative potential approach
in that the dierence of two potential evaluations is replaced by its quotient. One out of
two main equivalence theorems states that every solution with a multiplicative potential
representation is equivalent to this specically chosen ecient value in that the solution
of the initial game coincides with the MP value of an auxiliary game. The associated
potential function turns out to be of a multiplicative form (instead of an additive form)
with reference to the worth of all the coalitions. The second equivalence theorem presents
four additional characterizations of solutions that admit a multiplicative potential repre-
sentation, e.g., preservation of discrete ratios or path independence.
Keywords: cooperative TU-game, solution, proportionality, multiplicative potential rep-
resentation, preservation of ratios
1991 Mathematics Subject Classications: 91A12
1 Introduction
In physics the potential is a highly important concept, for instance a vector eld u is said
to be conservative if there exists a continuously dierentiable function U called potential
the gradient of which agrees with the vector eld (notation: 5U = u). There exist several
characterizations of conservative vector elds (e.g., 5jui = 5iuj , or every contour integral
with respect to the vector eld u is zero). Surprisingly, the successful treatment of the
potential in physics turned out to be reproducible, in the late eighties, in the mathematical
eld called cooperative game theory. Informally, a solution concept  on the universal game
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space G is said to possess a potential representation if it is the discrete gradient of a real-
valued function P on G called potential (notation: 5P =  ). In other words, if possible,
each component of the game-theoretic solution (or each player’s payo) may be interpreted
as the incremental return, determined by the dierence of the potential function evaluation
at the given cooperative game and one of its subgames in which the relevant player is not
included. In their innovative paper, Hart and Mas-Colell (cf. [7]) showed that the well-
known game-theoretic solution called Shapley value is the unique solution that has a potential
representation and satises the eciency principle as well. The role of the Shapley value has
been strengthened later on by a second fundamental result concerning the family of game-
theoretic solutions that possess a potential representation. This fundamental equivalence
theorem (cf. [1]) states that every single-valued solution with a potential representation is
equivalent to the Shapley value in that the solution of the initial game coincides with the
Shapley value of an auxiliary game.
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a new solution concept for cooperative games
(see Section 2) that can be regarded as the counterpart of the Shapley value whenever the
additive potential approach to the solution theory is replaced by a multiplicative potential
approach in that the dierence of two potential evaluations is replaced by its quotient. A
rst feature of the new solution concept called Multiplicativily Proportional (MP ) value is its
implicit description through a recursively dened sequence of real numbers (associated with
the initial game). In spite of its unusual introduction, the MP value turns out to possess
standard properties like eciency (by convention), the dummy player as well as the substitu-
tion properties, but fails to satisfy the additivity property (through which the Shapley value is
usually axiomatized). A second feature of the MP value is its proportionality solution in the
setting of two-person games. In Section 3 we claim a third feature of the MP value, namely
its equivalence to solution concepts with a multiplicative potential representation. In words,
the main equivalence Theorem 3.3 states that every single-valued solution with a multiplica-
tive potential representation is equivalent to the MP value in that the solution of the initial
game coincides with the MP value of an auxiliary game. Moreover, the determination of the
potential function itself, if it exists, results in a multiplicative form in that it is composed of
a product (instead of a sum) of expressions induced by both the initial game and the solu-
tion (which do simplify to the worth of coalitions in the initial game whenever the solution
is ecient). In Section 4, the main Theorem 4.1 treats four additional characterizations of
solution concepts with a multiplicative potential representation. Three out of these six equiv-
alent characterizations of solutions, stated in terms of the multiplicative potential approach
applied in cooperative game theory, resemble similar ones stated in physical terminology. For
instance, the characterization 5jui = 5iuj of a conservative vector eld u is analogous to
its discrete version 5j i = 5i j with respect to a game-theoretic solution  , known as the
law of preservation of discrete ratios. In the framework of the additive potential approach, it
concerns the law of preservation of discrete dierences (cf. [9]), otherwise called the balanced
contributions principle (cf. [1], [8], [12]). Moreover, the game-theoretic counterpart of the
path independence characterization of a conservative vector eld is treated. The two remain-
ing characterizations listed in Theorem 4.1 deal with two types of recursive formulae in order
to determine the solution concept applied to an n-person game, the determination of which
refers to the solution concept applied to various (n− 1)-person subgames.
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2 The introduction of the Multiplicativily Proportional value
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair hN; vi, where N is a nonempty,
nite set and v : 2N ! R is a characteristic function, dened on the power set of N , satisfying
v(;) := 0. Let G denote the set of all cooperative TU-games with an arbitrary player set.
Throughout this paper we deal with positive cooperative games the characteristic function
v : 2N ! R+ of which satises v(S) > 0 for all S 2 2N , S 6= ;. An element of N (notation:
i 2 N) and a nonempty subset S of N (notation: S  N or S 2 2N with S 6= ;) is called a
player and coalition respectively, and the associated positive real number v(S) is called the
worth of coalition S. The size (cardinality) of coalition S is denoted by jSj or, if no ambiguity
is possible, by s. Particularly, n denotes the size of the player set N . Given a (transferable
utility) game hN; vi and a coalition S, we write hS; vSi for the subgame obtained by restricting
v to subsets of S only (i.e., to 2S). Let G+ denote the set of all positive cooperative TU-games
with an arbitrary player set, whereas GN+ denotes the (vector) space of all positive games with
reference to a player set N which is xed beforehand.
Concerning the solution theory for cooperative TU-games, the paper is devoted to single-
valued solution concepts. Formally, a positive solution  on G+ (or on a particular subclass
of G+) associates a single payo vector  (N; v) = ( i(N; v))i2N 2 RN+ with every positive
TU-game hN; vi. The so-called allocation  i(N; v) to player i in the game hN; vi represents
an assessment by i of his gains from participating in the game. Until further notice, no
constraints are imposed upon a solution  on G+.
We say a solution  on G+ satises the well-known eciency property whenever it holdsX
i2N
 i(N; v) = v(N) for all hN; vi 2 G+. (2.1)
An ecient solution is called a value. Moreover, we say a solution  on G+ satises the pro-
portionality property for two-person games whenever the overall gains the amount of v(fi; jg)
are divided among the two players i; j in accordance with equal ratios with respect to their
individual worths v(fig) and v(fjg) respectively, that is  i(fi;jg;v)v(fig) =
 j(fi;jg;v)
v(fjg) or equivalently
(in the framework of eciency for two-person games),
 i(fi; jg; v) = v(fig)[v(fig) + v(fjg)]  v(fi; jg) for any two-person game hfi; jg; vi: (2.2)
In this section our main goal is to introduce a so-called multiplicative value which is supposed
to be proportional for two-person games and the second feature being that a player’s value in
a multi-person game is measured by the product of the worths of all the coalitions containing
the player. For reasons that will be explained in Section 3, the implicit description of the
fundamental value involves a sequence of real numbers which are dened recursively (with
respect to the inclusion of coalitions).
Denition 2.1. Let hN; vi 2 G+ be a positive cooperative game.
(i) Let the sequence of real numbers (vT )TN be given by the following recursive formula:
vT :=
1
v(T )

X
i2T
 Y
ST;
S3i
v(S)

 vTnfig for all T  N , T 6= ;, (2.3)
where v; := 1. Note that 
v
fig = 1 and 
v
fi;jg = v(fig) + v(fjg) for all i; j 2 N , i 6= j.
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(ii) The Multiplicativily Proportional value MPi(N; v) of player i 2 N in the positive game
hN; vi 2 G+ is dened as follows:
MPi(N; v) :=
 Y
SN;
S3i
v(S)


vNnfig
vN
for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N . (2.4)
Obviously, by (2.3) and (2.4), the Multiplicativily Proportional MP value satises the pro-
portionality property (2.2) for two-person games as well as the eciency principle (2.1). As
a matter of fact, the denominator vN in (2.4) is due to a normalization in order to guarantee
the eciency property for the solution under consideration.
Given two games hN; vi and hN;wi, let the product game hN; v wi be dened in a natural way
in that (v  w)(S) := v(S)  w(S) for all S  N . The Multiplicativily Proportional MP value
behaves in a semi-multiplicative manner since, by (2.4), the player’s value of the product game
equals the product of the player’s values of the two initial games, by taking into account the
relevant normalization coecients. Formally, it follows immediately from (2.4) that it holds
MPi(N; v  w) = 
v
N  wN

(vw)
N


(vw)
Nnfig
vNnfig  wNnfig
MPi(N; v) MPi(N;w) (2.5)
for all hN; vi 2 G+, hN;wi 2 G+ and all i 2 N . Particularly, in the setting of two-person
games, (2.5) simplies as follows:
MPi(fi; jg; v  w) = [v(fig) + v(fjg)]  [w(fig) + w(fjg)][v(fig)  w(fig) + v(fjg)  w(fjg)] MPi(fi; jg; v) MPi(fi; jg; w)
In view of (2.5), the prex \multiplicative" (in the weak sense) is justiable. Note that, for
the n-person unit game hN; vi dened by v(S) := 1 for all S  N , S 6= ;, its Multiplicativily
Proportional value is given by MPi(N; v) = 1n for all i 2 N since the corresponding sequence
(vT )TN is determined by 
v
T = jT j! for all T  N , T 6= ; (to be shown by a simple inductive
proof). In order to have a better understanding of the Multiplicativily Proportional value
as well as the underlying sequence of real numbers, we establish in the remaining part of
this section three standard properties for these concepts, namely properties with reference to
additive games, substitutes and dummy players. Firstly, it is shown that additive games are
invariant under the MP value in the sense that a player’s value of an additive game agrees
with the player’s individual worth.
Proposition 2.2. Let hN; vi 2 G+ be an additive game, that is v(S) :=
P
j2S v(fjg) for all
S  N , S 6= ;. Then the corresponding sequence of real numbers (vT )TN (see (2.3)) and
the Multiplicativily Proportional value MP (N; v) are given as follows:
vT =
Y
ST;
jSj2
v(S) and MPi(N; v) = v(fig) for all T  N and all i 2 N . (2.6)
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
Let hN; vi 2 G+ be an additive game. The inductive proof concerning the sequence (vT )TN
is as follows. For jT j = 2, say T = fi; jg, it holds that vfi;jg = v(fig) + v(fjg) = v(fi; jg)
where the latter equality is due to the additivity property for the game hN; vi. Let T  N
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with jT j  3. By applying the induction hypothesis to the real numbers of the sequence with
reference to coalitions of size jT j−1, it holds that vTnfig =
Q
STnfig;
jSj2
v(S) for all i 2 T . From
this we deduce the following chain of equalities:
vT
(2:3)
=
1
v(T )

X
i2T
 Y
ST;
S3i
v(S)

 vTnfig
(IH)
=
1
v(T )

X
i2T
v(fig) 
 Y
ST;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)


 Y
STnfig;
jSj2
v(S)

=
1
v(T )

X
i2T
v(fig) 
 Y
ST;
jSj2
v(S)

=
1
v(T )

 Y
ST;
jSj2
v(S)


X
i2T
v(fig)

=
Y
ST;
jSj2
v(S) (due to the additivity property for the game hN; vi):
This completes the inductive proof of the statement (2.6) concerning the sequence (vT )TN .
Now we are in a position to conclude that, for every additive game hN; vi, the Multiplicativily
Proportional value MPi(N; v) of any player i 2 N is determined by
MPi(N; v)
(2:4)
=
 Y
SN;
S3i
v(S)


vNnfig
vN
(2:6)
= v(fig) 
 Y
SN;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)


 Q
SNnfig;
jSj2
v(S)

 Q
SN;
jSj2
v(S)
 = v(fig)
2
Proposition 2.3. The Multiplicativily Proportional MP value possesses the substitution
property. To be exact, it holds
vTnfig = 
v
Tnfjg for all T  N with i; j 2 T , and MPi(N; v) = MPj(N; v) (2.7)
whenever players i; j 2 N are substitutes in the game hN; vi 2 G+, i.e., v(S[fig) = v(S[fjg)
for all S  Nnfi; jg.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.
The inductive proof concerning the real numbers vTnfkg, k 2 fi; jg, for a xed pair i; j 2 N
of substitutes in the game hN; vi 2 G+, is as follows. For jT j = 2, say T = fi; jg, it holds
that vTnfig = 
v
fjg = 1 = 
v
fig = 
v
Tnfjg. For jT j = 3, say T = fi; j; kg, it holds that
vTnfig = 
v
fj;kg = v(fjg) + v(fkg) = v(fig) + v(fkg) = vfi;kg = vTnfjg. Let T  N with
i 2 T , j 2 T , and jT j  4. By applying the induction hypothesis to the real numbers with
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reference to the coalitions Tnfkg, k 2 Tnfi; jg, of size jT j−1, it holds that vTnfi;kg = vTnfj;kg
for all k 2 Tnfi; jg. Moreover, the following chain of equalities holds:
vTnfig
(2:3)
=
1
v(Tnfig) 
X
k2Tnfig
 Y
STnfig;
S3k
v(S)

 vTnfi;kg
=
1
v(Tnfig) 
 Y
STnfig;
S3j
v(S)

 vTnfi;jg +
X
k2Tnfi;jg
 Y
STnfig;
S3k
v(S)

 vTnfi;kg

Since players i; j are substitutes in the game hN; vi 2 G+, it holds that v(Tnfig) = v(Tnfjg)
as well asY
STnfig;
S3j
v(S) =
Y
STnfjg;
S3i
v(S) and
Y
STnfig;
S3k
v(S) =
Y
STnfjg;
S3k
v(S) for all k 2 Tnfi; jg.
This completes the inductive proof of the statement vTnfig = 
v
Tnfjg for all T  N with i 2 T ,
j 2 T (if i; j are substitutes). Particularly, vNnfig = vNnfjg and together with the equalityQ
SN;
S3i
v(S) =
Q
SN;
S3j
v(S), it follows immediately from the description (2.4) of the MP value
that MPi(N; v) = MPj(N; v) for any substitutes i; j 2 N in the game hN; vi 2 G+. 2
Proposition 2.4. The Multiplicativily Proportional MP value possesses the dummy player
property. To be exact, it holds
vT =
 Y
ST;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)

 vTnfig for all T  N with i 2 T and MPi(N; v) = v(fig) (2.8)
whenever player i 2 N is a dummy in the game hN; vi 2 G+, i.e., v(S [ fig) − v(S) = v(fig)
for all S  Nnfig.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.
The inductive proof concerning the real numbers vT , T  N with i 2 T , for a xed dummy
player i 2 N in the game hN; vi 2 G+, is as follows. For jT j = 2, say T = fi; jg, it holds that
vfi;jg = v(fig) + v(fjg) = v(fi; jg) = v(fi; jg)  vfjg. Let T  N with i 2 T and jT j  3. By
applying the induction hypothesis to the real numbers with reference to the coalitions Tnfkg,
k 2 Tnfig, of size jT j−1, it holds that vTnfkg =
Q
STnfkg;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)

vTnfi;kg for all k 2 Tnfig.
Moreover, the following chain of equalities holds:
vT
(2:3)
=
1
v(T )

X
k2T
 Y
ST;
S3k
v(S)

 vTnfkg
(IH)
=
1
v(T )

 Y
ST;
S3i
v(S)

 vTnfig +
X
k2Tnfig
 Y
ST;
S3k
v(S)


 Y
STnfkg;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)

 vTnfi;kg

=
1
v(T )

 Y
ST;
S3i
v(S)

 vTnfig +
X
k2Tnfig
 Y
ST;
S3k; S 63i
v(S)


 Y
ST;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)

 vTnfi;kg

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=
1
v(T )

 Y
ST;
S3i
v(S)

 vTnfig +
 Y
ST;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)


X
k2Tnfig
 Y
STnfig;
S3k
v(S)

 vTnfi;kg

(2:3)
=
1
v(T )

 Y
ST;
S3i
v(S)

 vTnfig +
 Y
ST;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)

 v(Tnfig)  vTnfig

=
1
v(T )

 Y
ST;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)

 vTnfig 

v(fig) + v(Tnfig)

=
 Y
ST;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)

 vTnfig (since player i is a dummy in the game hN; vi).
This completes the inductive proof of the statement vT =
Q
ST;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)

 vTnfig for all
T  N with i 2 T (if player i is a dummy). Particularly, vN =
Q
SN;
S3i; jSj2
v(S)

vNnfig and
it follows immediately from the description (2.4) of the MP value that MPi(N; v) = v(fig)
for any dummy player i 2 N in the game hN; vi 2 G+. 2
To conclude with, the Multiplicativily Proportional MP value possesses the monotonicity
property in that MPi(N; v)  MPi(N;w) for all i 2 N and all hN; vi 2 G+, hN;wi 2 G+,
satisfying v(N)  w(N) and v(S) = w(S) for all S $ N (notation: v  w). The monotonicity
property for the MP value follows immediately from its description (2.4), by noting that the
underlying sequence of real numbers, recursively given by (2.3), does not change at all, that is
we claim vT = 
w
T for all T  N , T 6= ;, whenever v  w. The inductive proof of this claim is
rather simple and left to the reader. Due to this claim, the increase in the players’ payos is
proportional to the increase in the worth of the grand coalition. To be exact, MPi(N;v)MPi(N;w) =
v(N)
w(N)
for all i 2 N whenever v  w.
It is still an open problem to axiomatize the Multiplicativily Proportional MP value on
the game space with a xed player set by means of its eciency, dummy player property,
substitution (or anonymity) property, and another \multiplicativity" property (that replaces
the known additivity property in the axiomatization of the Shapley value).
3 One Characterization of solutions that admit a mulitiplica-
tive potential
The main goal of this section is to show that the Multiplicativily Proportional MP value,
as given by (2.4), is the most fundamental solution among all the solutions with a so-called
multiplicative potential representation (as introduced in [10]). The main result states that
any solution with a multiplicative potential representation is somehow equivalent to the MP
value, by taking into account a particular transformation on positive games.
Denition 3.1. (cf. [10]) Let  be a positive solution on G+.
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(i) We say the solution  admits a multiplicative potential if there exists a function P :
G+ ! R+ satisfying
P (N; v)
P (Nnfig; vNnfig)
=  i(N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N . (3.1)
(ii) The mapping F : G+ ! G+ associates with every game hN; vi 2 G+ its solution game
hN;F v i 2 G+ dened to be
F v (S) :=
X
j2S
 j(S; vS) for all S  N , S 6= ;. (3.2)
In words, the (multiplicative) potential function P represents a scalar evaluation for coop-
erative TU-games, of which any player’s marginal ratio agrees with the player’s allocation
according to the relevant solution  (notation: 5P =  ). If the potential exists, it is
uniquely determined up to a (multiplicative) constant and the potential’s formula (see (3.6))
to be listed later on in our fundamental Equivalence Theorem 3.3 justies the prex \multi-
plicative". Usually, it is tacitly assumed that the potential function is unit-normalized (i.e.,
P (;; v) := 1).
By (3.2), the worth F v (S) of coalition S in the solution game hN;F v i represents the overall
gains (according to the solution  ) to the members of S from participating in the induced
subgame hS; vSi (on the understanding that players outside S are supposed not to cooperate).
Generally speaking, the solution game diers from the initial game. Notice that both games
are the same if and only if the solution  satises the eciency principle (2.1).
Example 3.2. Semi-values (including the Shapley and Banzhaf values) for cooperative games
have been introduced by [6]. Analogous to these additive semi-values, we say a positive
solution  on G+ is a multiplicative semi-value if it is the exponential form of some additive
semi-value, that is of the following multiplicative form:
 i(N; v) =
Y
SNnfig
epn(s+1)[v(S[fig)−v(S)] for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N , (3.3)
where the collection of real numbers called weights fpn(t) 2 R j n 2 f1; 2; : : :g; t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ngg
is supposed to satisfy the upwards triangle property, i.e.,
pn(s) + pn(s+ 1) = pn−1(s) for all n  2 and all 1  s  n− 1. (3.4)
Two well-known examples of such a collection of weights are given by pn(s) := 1n(n−1s−1)
and
pn(s) := (12)
n−1 (yielding the multiplicative versions of the Shapley value and the Banzhaf
value respectively). We claim the multiplicative semi-value  , arising from any collection
of weights satisfying the upwards triangle property, admits a multiplicative potential the
function P : G+ ! R+ of which is given by
P (N; v) =
Y
SN
epn(s)v(S) for all hN; vi 2 G+. (3.5)
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Indeed, for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N , straightforward computations yield the following
chain of equalities:
P (N; v)
P (Nnfig; vNnfig)
(3:5)
=
Q
SN
epn(s)v(S)Q
SNnfig
epn−1(s)v(S)
=
 Y
SN;
S3i
epn(s)v(S)


 Y
SNnfig
epn(s)v(S)
epn−1(s)v(S)

=
 Y
SNnfig
epn(s+1)v(S[fig)


 Y
SNnfig
e[pn(s)−pn−1(s)]v(S)

(3:4)
=
 Y
SNnfig
epn(s+1)v(S[fig)


 Y
SNnfig
e−pn(s+1)v(S)

=
Y
SNnfig

epn(s+1)v(S[fig)  e−pn(s+1)v(S)

=
Y
SNnfig
epn(s+1)[v(S[fig)−v(S)]
(3:3)
=  i(N; v):
In the framework of multiplicative semi-values, the underlying weights pn(s) are not neces-
sarily non-negative.
Above all, we treat an equivalence theorem concerning solutions that admit a multiplicative
potential; the main result of which is referring to the Multiplicativily Proportional MP value,
as given by (2.4).
Theorem 3.3. (Equivalence Theorem) Consider the setting of Denitions 2.1 and 3.1.
(i) If a solution  on G+ admits a multiplicative potential function P : G+ ! R+, then
the following holds:
P (N; v) =


(F v )
N
−1

Y
SN;
S 6=;
F v (S) and  (N; v) = MP (N;F
v
 ) (3.6)
for all hN; vi 2 G+. In words, the solution of any positive game agrees with the Multi-
plicativily Proportional value of the associated solution game.
(ii) If  (N; v) = MP (N;F v ) for all hN; vi 2 G+, then the solution  admits a multiplicative
potential.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. (A direct and computational proof)
(i) Suppose the solution  on G+ admits a multiplicative potential function P : G+ ! R+.
The proof of the formula (3.6) for the multiplicative potential function proceeds by induction
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on the size n, n  1, of the player set N . For n = 1, say hfig; vi 2 G+, the (tacitly assumed)
unit-normalization of the potential function P (in that P (;; v) = 1) yields
F v (fig)

(F v )
fig
= F v (fig)
(3:2)
=  i(fig; v) (3:1)= P (fig; v)
P (;; v) = P (fig; v):
So, (3.6) holds whenever n = 1. Let hN; vi 2 G+ (n  2) and suppose (3.6) holds for all
games the player set of which contains less than n players. By adding (3.1) over all i 2 N ,
we derive a recursive formula for the multiplicative potential function P as follows:X
i2N
P (N; v)
P (Nnfig; vNnfig)
=
X
i2N
 i(N; v)
(3:2)
= F v (N) or equivalently,
P (N; v) = F v (N) 
X
i2N
1
P (Nnfig; vNnfig)
−1
(3.7)
At this stage, notice that, for all i 2 N , the solution game hNnfig; F (vNnfig) i and the subgame
hNnfig; (F v )Nnfigi are equal since, for all S  Nnfig, S 6= ;, it holds
F
(vNnfig)
 (S) =
X
j2S
 j(S; (vNnfig)S) =
X
j2S
 j(S; vS) = F v (S) = (F
v
 )Nnfig(S)
Moreover, it holds that 
(F
(vNnfig)
 )
Nnfig = 
(F v )Nnfig
Nnfig = 
(F v )
Nnfig for all i 2 N . >From both
these observations and by applying the potential’s induction hypothesis (3.6) to all subgames
hNnfig; vNnfigi, i 2 N , with n− 1 players , we obtain the following:
P (Nnfig; vNnfig) (3:6)=


(F v )
Nnfig
−1

Y
SNnfig;
S 6=;
F v (S) for all i 2 N . (3.8)
For notational convenience, write w := F v . From the recursive formula (3.7), together with
the induction hypothesis result (3.8), the description (2.4) of the Multiplicativily Propor-
tional value and its eciency property applied to the game hN;wi respectively, we obtain the
following chain of equalities:
P (N; v)
(3:7)
= F v (N) 
X
i2N
1
P (Nnfig; vNnfig)
−1
(3:8)
= w(N) 
X
i2N
wNnfig 
 Y
SNnfig;
S 6=;
w(S)
−1−1
= w(N) 
X
i2N
wNnfig 
 Y
SN;
S3i
w(S)


 Y
SN;
S 6=;
w(S)
−1−1
= w(N) 
 Y
SN;
S 6=;
w(S)


X
i2N
wNnfig 
 Y
SN;
S3i
w(S)
−1
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(2:4)
= w(N) 
 Y
SN;
S 6=;
w(S)


X
i2N
wN MPi(N;w)
−1
= w(N) 
 Y
SN;
S 6=;
w(S)



wN  w(N)
−1
=

wN
−1

Y
SN;
S 6=;
w(S)
This completes the inductive proof of the formula (3.6) for the multiplicative potential function
P . In order to prove the remaining statement  (N; v) = MP (N;F v ), let hN; vi 2 G+.
From the multiplicative potential representation (3.1) for the solution  , the formula (3.6)
for the multiplicative potential function P and the description (2.4) of the Multiplicativily
Proportional value applied to the game hN;wi, we deduce that, for all i 2 N , it holds
 i(N; v)
(3:1)
=
P (N; v)
P (Nnfig; vNnfig)
(3:6)
=

wN
−1

 Y
SN;
S 6=;
w(S)

 wNnfig 
 Y
SNnfig;
S 6=;
w(S)
−1
=
 Y
SN;
S3i
w(S)


wNnfig
wN
(2:4)
= MPi(N;w) = MPi(N;F v ) (as was to be shown):
(ii) Suppose the solution  satises  (N; v) = MP (N;F v ) for all hN; vi 2 G+. Dene the
function P : G+ ! R+ as given by (3.6). Since the latter computations carried out in the
proof of part (i) are still valid, it follows immediately that P (N;v)P (Nnfig;vNnfig) = MPi(N;F
v
 ) =
 i(N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N . Thus,  admits a multiplicative potential. 2
4 Additional Characterizations of solutions that admit a muli-
tiplicative potential
In this section we generalize the fundamental equivalence Theorem 3.3 in that we put to-
gether ve dierent, but equivalent characterizations of solutions that admit a multiplicative
potential. Three of these characterizations have clear anities with the potential approach
in physics (so that the former additive representations are to be replaced by multiplicative
representations).
Theorem 4.1. Consider the setting of Denitions 2.1 and 3.1. Let  be a positive solution
on G+. Then the following six statements are equivalent.
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(i)  admits a multiplicative potential, i.e., there exists a function P : G+ ! R+ satisfying
P (N; v)
P (Nnfig; vNnfig)
=  i(N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N . (4.1)
We say  is a discrete rationator eld (in physics notation:  i =5iP for all i 2 N or
briefly,  = 5P ).
(ii)  satises the balanced ratios axiom, i.e., for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j,
it holds
 i(N; v)
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
=
 j(N; v)
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
(4.2)
We say  preserves ratios (in physics notation: 5j i = 5i j for all i 2 N , j 2 N).
(iii)  satises the next recursive formula: for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N , it holds
 i(N; v) = F v (N) 

1 +
X
j2Nnfig
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
−1
(4.3)
(iv)  (N; v) = MP (N;F v ) for all hN; vi 2 G+. That is, the solution of any game agrees
with the Multiplicativily Proportional value of the associated solution game (see (3.2)).
(v)  satises the multiplicative path independence, i.e., for all hN; vi 2 G+ it holdsY
i2N
 i(R!i ; vR!i ) is the same for every order (one-to-one function) ! : N ! N (4.4)
where, for every order ! : N ! N of the player set N and every player i 2 N , the
associated coalition R!i  N of predecessors is given by R!i := fj 2 N j !(j)  !(i)g.
(vi)  satises the next formula: for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N , it holds
 i(N; v)
n


Gv (N)
−1
=
 Y
j2Nnfig
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)



Gv (Nnfig)
−1
(4.5)
where Gv (S) :=
Y
j2S
 j(S; vS) for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all S  N , S 6= ;. (4.6)
Remark 4.2. We claim the Multiplicativily Proportional MP value preserves ratios since,
by (2.4), for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N , j 2 N , it holds
MPi(N; v)
MPi(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
(2:4)
=
 Q
SN;
S3i
v(S)

 vNnfig  [vN ]−1Q
SNnfjg;
S3i
v(S)

 vNnfi;jg 
h
vNnfjg
i−1
=
 Y
SN;
S3i; S3j
v(S)


vNnfig  vNnfjg
vN  vNnfi;jg
12
Obviously, the latter expression remains unaltered when interchanging the roles of both play-
ers i and j and consequently, the MP value preserves ratios. As a matter of fact, the
preservation of ratios for a solution is the very reason to take into account the recursively
dened real numbers vNnfig, i 2 N , (and consequently, its normalization coecient vN due to
eciency) when proposing a semi-multiplicative solution of the form (2.4). Because the MP
value is ecient, the solution game hN;F vMP i agrees with the initial game hN; vi and thus,
by Theorem 3.3, its multiplicative potential representation arises from the potential function
PMP : G+ ! R+ given by PMP (N; v) =

vN
−1
QSN;
S 6=;
v(S) for all hN; vi 2 G+. In words,
the potential evaluation of a positive cooperative game equals, up to a normalization, the
product of the worths of all the coalitions (and thus, the prex \multiplicative" is justiable).
In the framework of additive games hN; vi as treated in Proposition 2.2, we claim the potential
function is given by PMP (N; v) =
Q
i2N
v(fig) since it holds
PMP (N; v)
(3:6)
=

vN
−1

Y
SN;
S 6=;
v(S)
(2:6)
=
 Y
SN;
jSj2
v(S)
−1

 Y
SN;
S 6=;
v(S)

=
Y
i2N
v(fig)
Ortmann (cf. [10], Theorem 2.4, page 238) already proved the equivalence (i)() (ii) stated
in Theorem 4.1. For the sake of completeness, we repeat its proof and subsequently, we
prove the chain of implications (ii) =) (iii) =) (iv) =) (i) as well as the two equivalences
(i)() (v) and (ii)() (vi).
Proof of the equivalence (i)() (ii) stated in Theorem 4.1.
First suppose (i) holds. From the multiplicative potential representation (4.1) for the solution
 we derive that, for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N , j 2 N , it holds
(5j i)(N; v) =
 i(N; v)
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
(4:1)
=

P (N; v)
P (Nnfig; vNnfig)



P (Nnfi; jg; vNnfi;jg)
P (Nnfjg; vNnfjg)

=
P (N; v)  P (Nnfi; jg; vNnfi;jg)
P (Nnfig; vNnfig)  P (Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
The very last formula remains unaltered when interchanging the roles of both players i and j.
Thus, (5j i)(N; v) = (5i j)(N; v). Briefly, 5j i = 5j(5iP ) = 5i(5jP ) = 5i j . This
proves the implication (i) =) (ii).
In order to prove the converse implication, suppose (ii) holds. Under these circumstances, it is
necessary and sucient to show that P (N; v) :=  i(N; v)  P (Nnfig; vNnfig) is well-dened
for all hN; vi 2 G+, in spite of its dependence on player i 2 N . Equivalently, we show by
induction on the size n, n  2, of the player set N that the following holds:
 i(N; v)  P (Nnfig; vNnfig) =  j(N; v)  P (Nnfjg; vNnfjg) (4.7)
for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N , j 2 N . For n = 2, say hfi; jg; vi 2 G+, (4.7) holds because
of
 i(fi; jg; v)  P (fjg; vfjg) =  i(fi; jg; v)   j(fjg; vfjg)  P (;; v)
(4:2)
=  j(fi; jg; v)   i(fig; vfig)  P (;; v)
=  j(fi; jg; v)  P (fig; vfig)
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So, (4.7) holds whenever n = 2. Let hN; vi 2 G+ (n  3) and i 2 N , j 2 N . Now we deduce
from the balanced ratios property (4.2) for the solution  and the induction hypothesis (4.7)
applied to subgames with n− 1 players respectively, that the following holds:
  i(N; v)  P (Nnfig; vNnfig)
(4:2)
=  j(N; v) 

 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)

 P (Nnfig; vNnfig)
(4:7)
=  j(N; v) 

P (Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
P (Nnfi; jg; vNnfi;jg)



P (Nnfi; jg; vNnfi;jg)
P (Nnfig; vNnfig)

 P (Nnfig; vNnfig)
=  j(N; v)  P (Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
This completes the inductive proof of (4.7). Therefore, the function P (N; v) :=  i(N; v) 
P (Nnfig; vNnfig) is well-dened for all hN; vi 2 G+. In words,  admits a multiplicative
potential and this proves the implication (ii) =) (i). 2
Proof of the implication (ii) =) (iii) stated in Theorem 4.1.
Suppose (ii) holds. Let hN; vi 2 G+ and i 2 N . Since  preserves ratios, (4.2) implies that it
holds
 j(N; v) =  i(N; v) 

 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)

for all j 2 Nnfig. (4.8)
Adding (4.8) over all j 2 Nnfig and recalling (3.2) concerning the solution game, we deduce
that the following chain of equalities holds:
F v (N)
(3:2)
=
X
j2N
 j(N; v) =  i(N; v) +
X
j2Nnfig
 j(N; v)
(4:8)
=  i(N; v) +  i(N; v) 
X
j2Nnfig
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
=  i(N; v) 

1 +
X
j2Nnfig
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)

So, the recursive formula (4.3) holds. This proves the implication (ii) =) (iii). 2
Proof of the implication (iii) =) (iv) stated in Theorem 4.1.
Suppose (iii) holds. The proof of the statement  (N; v) = MP (N;F v ) proceeds by induction
on the size n, n  1, of the player set N . For n = 1, say hfig; vi 2 G+, the equality
 (N; v) = MP (N;F v ) holds because of  i(fig; v)
(3:2)
= F v (fig) = MPi(fig; F v ). Let hN; vi 2
G+ (n  2) and suppose  (N; u) = MP (N; Fu ) holds for all games hN; ui the player set
N of which contains less than n players. Particularly, by applying the induction hypothesis
to all subgames hNnfkg; vNnfkgi, k 2 N , with n− 1 players, we obtain the following: for all
j 2 N , k 2 N , j 6= k, it holds that
 j(Nnfkg; vNnfkg) = MPj(Nnfkg; F (vNnfkg) ) = MPj(Nnfkg; (F v )Nnfkg)
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where the latter equality follows from the fact that, for all k 2 N , the solution game
hNnfkg; F (vNnfkg) i and the subgame hNnfkg; (F v )Nnfkgi are equal (as shown in the proof
of Theorem 3.3(i)). >From the recursive formula (4.3) for  , the induction hypothesis applied
to almost all subgames with n − 1 players, the balanced ratios property (4.2) for the MP
value as well as its eciency property respectively, we deduce that, for all i 2 N , it holds,
 i(N; v)
(4:3)
= F v (N) 

1 +
X
j2Nnfig
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
−1
(IH)
= F v (N) 

1 +
X
j2Nnfig
MPj(Nnfig; (F v )Nnfig)
MPi(Nnfjg; (F v )Nnfjg)
−1
(4:2)
= F v (N) 

1 +
X
j2Nnfig
MPj(N;F v )
MPi(N;F v )
−1
= MPi(N;F v )  F v (N) 
X
j2N
MPj(N;F v )
−1
= MPi(N;F v )
This completes the inductive proof of the statement  (N; v) = MP (N;F v ). This proves the
implication (iii) =) (iv). 2
Proof of the equivalence (i)() (v) stated in Theorem 4.1.
Suppose (i) holds. Let hN; vi 2 G+ and ! : N ! N be an order of N . Write N =
fi1; i2; : : : ; ing such that !(ik) = k for all 1  k  n. Clearly, R!ik = fi1; i2; : : : ; ikg for
all 1  k  n and particularly, R!iknfikg = R!ik−1 for all 1  k  n, where R!i0 := ;. >From
this, together with the potential representation (4.1), we deduce that the following holds:
 ik(R
!
ik
; vR!ik
) =
P (R!ik ; vR!ik )
P (R!ik−1 ; vR!ik−1 )
for all 1  k  n, and consequently,
Y
i2N
 i(R!i ; vR!i ) =
nY
k=1
 ik(R
!
ik
; vR!ik
) =
nY
k=1
 P (R!ik ; vR!ik )
P (R!ik−1 ; vR!ik−1 )

=
P (R!in ; vR!in )
P (;; v)
=
P (N; v)
1
= P (N; v)
So, the multiplicative path independence (4.4) holds. This proves the implication (i) =) (v).
In order to prove the converse implication, suppose (v) holds. Let hN; vi 2 G+. By (4.4), the
potential P (N; v) is well-dened by
Q
k2N
 k(R!k ; vR!k ) for any order ! on the relevant player
set N . For any i 2 N , choose some order ! on N satisfying !(i) = n and thus, the order ! on
Nnfig, dened to be the restriction of ! to Nnfig, satises R!k = R!k for all k 2 Nnfig. From
this, together with the denition of the potential function P , we derive that the following
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chain of equalities holds:
P (Nnfig; vNnfig) =
Y
k2Nnfig
 k(R!k ; vR!k ) =
Y
k2Nnfig
 k(R!k ; vR!k ) =
Q
k2N
 k(R!k ; vR!k )
 i(R!i ; vR!i )
=
P (N; v)
 i(N; v)
So, the potential representation (4.1) holds. This proves the implication (v) =) (i). 2
Proof of the equivalence (ii)() (vi) stated in Theorem 4.1.
First suppose (ii) holds. Let hN; vi 2 G+ and i 2 N . Multiplying the balanced ratios condition
(4.2) over all j 2 Nnfig yields
 i(N; v)
n−1
Q
j2Nnfig
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
=
Q
j2N
 j(N; v)
 i(N; v)

 Y
j2Nnfig
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
−1
or equivalently,

 i(N; v)
n

 Y
j2N
 j(N; v)
−1
=
 Y
j2Nnfig
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)


 Y
j2Nnfig
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
−1
In view of (4.6), this proves the implication (ii) =) (vi).
In order to prove the converse implication, suppose (vi) holds. We claim the balanced ratios
property (4.2) for the solution  holds, i.e.,
 i(N; v)
 j(N; v)
=
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
for all hN; vi 2 G+ and all i 2 N , j 2 N . (4.9)
The proof of (4.9) proceeds by induction on the size n, n  2, of the player set N . For n = 2,
say hfi; jg; vi 2 G+, we deduce from the recursive formula (4.5) and (4.6) respectively, that
the following holds:
 i(fi; jg; v)
 j(fi; jg; v)
2
(4:5)
=

Gv (fi; jg)
Gv (fjg)
  i(fig; vfig)



Gv (fig)
Gv (fi; jg)
 1
 j(fjg; vfjg)

(4:6)
=

 i(fig; vfig)
 j(fjg; vfjg)



 i(fig; vfig)
 j(fjg; vfjg)

=

 i(fig; vfig)
 j(fjg; vfjg)
2
So, (4.9) holds whenever n = 2. Let hN; vi 2 G+ (n  3), and i 2 N , j 2 N , and suppose (4.9)
holds for all games the player set of which contains less than n players. >From the recursive
formula (4.5) and the induction hypothesis (4.9) applied to almost all subgames with n − 1
players, we deduce that the following holds:

 i(N; v)
 j(N; v)
n
=

 i(N; v)
n

 j(N; v)
n (4:5)= Gv (N)Gv (Nnfig)  G
v
 (Nnfjg)
Gv (N)

Q
k2Nnfig
 i(Nnfkg; vNnfkg)Q
k2Nnfjg
 j(Nnfkg; vNnfkg)
=
Gv (Nnfjg)
Gv (Nnfig)
  i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)

 Y
k2Nnfi;jg

 i(Nnfkg; vNnfkg)
 j(Nnfkg; vNnfkg)

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(4:9)
=
Gv (Nnfjg)
Gv (Nnfig)
  i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)

 Y
k2Nnfi;jg

 i(Nnfj; kg; vNnfj;kg)
 j(Nnfi; kg; vNnfi;kg)

(4:5)
=
 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)


 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
n−1

 j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
n−1 =  i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg) j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
n
This completes the inductive proof of (4.9). In words, the solution  satises the balanced
ratios property and this proves the implication (vi) =) (ii). 2
5 Summary and conclusion
In summary, we introduced a new solution concept, called MP value, from the viewpoint
that the MP value turns out to be the most appealing representative of the family of (not
necessarily ecient) game-theoretic solutions with a multiplicative potential representation.
Due to some equivalent characterizations, the MP value is the unique solution that satises
the eciency property as well as the law of preservation of discrete ratios (see Remark 4.2).
Consequently, the MP value agrees with the so-called proportional value introduced by Ort-
mann through both the eciency axiom and the preservation of ratios (cf. [10], Theorem
2.6, page 239). Besides this implicit denition of the proportional value, Ortmann proves
the equivalence (4.1) () (4.2) stated in our Theorem 4.1 (cf. [10], Theorem 2.4, page 238)
and proves elementary properties like monotonicity, dummy player property, anonymity, and
inessential (additive) game property for the proportional value, the proofs of which are based
on the recursive formula (4.3), provided eciency applies (cf. [10], Propositions 4.2, 4.3, 4.5,
pages 245-247). In fact, in spite of its implicit description, Ortmann’s paper axiomatizes the
proportional value by means of the consistency (with reference to Hart and Mas-Colell’s re-
duced game) as well as the proportionality property for two-person games (cf. [10], Theorems
2.10{2.11, pages 241-243). Generally speaking, Ortmann’s paper introduces the very same
value from a much dierent viewpoint, leaves out a lot of information about the value itself
and its potential function. Hence, our introduction of the MP value by Denition 2.1, and,
most of all, the two equivalence Theorems 3.3 and 4.1 contribute very much to a better un-
derstanding of an appealing value. To conclude with, the MP value deserves a lot of further
research.
Example 5.1. Consider the (numerical) bankruptcy situation with three creditors, the claims
of which are given by d1 = d2 = 2, d3 = 4, whereas the estate E = 7. Generally speaking,
the associated bankruptcy game hN; vi is dened to be v(S) := max
h
0; E −Pi2NnS dii
for all S  N , S 6= ; (cf. [2], [3]). The numerical bankruptcy game hN; vi is given by
v(f1g) = v(f2g) = 1, v(f3g) = v(f1; 2g) = 3, v(f1; 3g) = v(f2; 3g) = 5 and v(N) = 7. Note
that players 1 and 2 are substitutes (since d1 = d2). Concerning the MP value for the three
two-person subgames, the proportionality solution (2.2) yields MP (f1; 2g; vf1;2g) = (32 ; 32) and
MP (f1; 3g; vf1;3g) = MP (f2; 3g; vf2;3g) = (54 ; 154 ). By the recursive formula (4.3), we get
MP1(N; v) = v(N) 

1 +
MP2(f2; 3g; vf2;3g)
MP1(f1; 3g; vf1;3g)
+
MP3(f2; 3g; vf2;3g)
MP1(f1; 2g; vf1;2g)
−1
= 7  2
9
=
14
9
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By the substitution and eciency properties for the MP value, we conclude that the MP
value is given by MP (N; v) = 19 (14; 14; 35), whereas the Shapley value (cf. [11], [13]) is given
by Sh(N; v) = 19  (15; 15; 33). Clearly, the creditor with the largest claim prefers the MP
value to the Shapley value. For the sake of completeness, by (2.3), the corresponding sequence
of real numbers (vT )TN is given by 
v
f1g = 
v
f2g = 
v
f3g = 1, 
v
f1;2g = 2, 
v
f1;3g = 
v
f2;3g = 4,
vf1;2;3g = 270. By its description (2.4), the MP value for any player can be computed directly.
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